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The Use of Rules and Standards to
Define a Transsexual's Sex for the
Purpose of Marriage:
An Argument for a Hybrid Approach
BRIANA LYNN MORGAN*
INTRODUCTION
J'Noel was born with what she called a "birth defect." Although she
felt like a female even before puberty, she still had a penis and testicles.
The doctors determined that J'Noel suffered from gender identity disor-
der, an intersexual condition in which one's mental sex differs from one's
physical sex.' Despite this conflict, J'Noel spent the first part of her
adulthood trying to live in the "male" sex that she was assigned, even go-
ing so far as to marry a female. After consulting with medical profession-
als, however, she finally realized that this life was not for her. With
medical help and advice, J'Noel began sex reassignment in order to en-
sure that her external sexual characteristics were congruent with who she
was inside.
The procedure, actually a series of many procedures, was extensive,
intrusive, time-consuming, and painful. J'Noel underwent electrolysis
and thermolysis to remove the hair on her face, neck, and chest. She be-
gan to take hormones to promote breast enlargement, increase body fat,
reduce muscle mass, and decrease the oiliness of her skin. She had a tra-
cheal shave to change her voice, and a forehead/eyebrow lift and rhino-
plasty to make her face look more feminine. After all that, J'Noel and
her psychiatrist determined that she must undergo total sex reassignment
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.S., Santa Clara
University, 2000. I would like to thank Chris Daley of the Transgender Project, National Center for
Lesbian Rights, for his insight and time, Professor Richard Marcus, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, for his ideas and honest input, and Dr. Thomas Jay Rosenbaum for his medical
advice. This paper certainly could not have been written without the help of the Hastings Law Journal
and Alesha Breite, the support of Peter Rosenbaum, or the advice and inspiration of Professor Lois
Weithorn of U.C. Hastings. Thank you so much for all your help.
i. Throughout this Note the term "mental sex" will be used to refer to one's gender identity. See
discussion infra Part L.A for an explanation of gender identity.
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in order to fully treat her disorder. J'Noel therefore underwent surgery
where her doctor cut and inverted the penis and used part of the skin to
form a female vagina, labia, and clitoris. After the surgery, her doctors
determined that she was a fully functioning, anatomical female, who
could and should live as a female in every way.
J'Noel did just that. She petitioned for, and received, a new birth
certificate from the state determining her sex to be female. She also met
a man named Marshall, with whom she was sexually active. After inform-
ing him of her history as a man, the two became serious, and Marshall
proposed. They were wed soon after under state law.
Sadly, Marshall died only a year later, and J'Noel's legal problems
started soon afterward. Marshall died intestate, and, being his wife,
J'Noel expects to receive a share of his estate. Unfortunately, however,
Marshall also had a son who had been estranged from his father for some
years. This son has petitioned the court to be regarded as the sole heir of
Marshall, the father he had not spoken to in years, on the grounds that
his father's marriage with J'Noel was invalid. Marshall's son argues that
J'Noel, a female according to the medical profession, the state, and, most
importantly, Marshall, is really a male, and therefore the marriage was an
invalid homosexual union. How should the court resolve this issue?
The above facts are based on an actual situation presented in In re
Estate of Gardiner, a Kansas Supreme Court case decided in 2002.2 The
circumstances involved in Gardiner were not isolated. In fact, many
Americans experience intersexual conditions like J'Noel's.3 While the
percentage of individuals affected with gender identity disorder and the
number who have undergone sex reassignment procedures is difficult to
obtain, as many such individuals prefer to remain unknown, according to
one article, approximately 6ooo people had undergone sex reassignment
surgery in the United States by I983.' Another article reported that
"[riecent medical literature indicates that approximately one to four per-
cent of the world's population may be intersexed and have either am-
biguous or noncongruent sex features."5 It has been estimated that "the
2. 42 P.3 d 120 (Kan. 2002).
3. See discussion infra Part L.A for an explanation of intersexual conditions including gender
identity disorder.
4. Jerold Taitz, Judicial Determination of the Sexual Identity of Post-Operative Transsexuals: A
New Form of Sex Discrimination, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 53, 56 (1987). This statistic was derived from the
expert testimony introduced and cited by the court as authoritative in Rush v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp.
856, 864 (N.D. Ga. 1983). See also Matt Clark et al., The Transsexuals, NEWSWEEK, NOV. 22, 1976, at
io4 (stating that there were approximately 3000 post-operative transsexuals in the United States in
1976).
5. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law
and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 267 (I99) (footnotes omitted).
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manner in which the law defines 'male', 'female', and 'sex' will have a
profound impact on at least 2.7 million persons in the United States.",
6
Given the frequency of sex reassignment surgeries in America today,
transsexuals are increasingly looking to the courts to provide a solution
to their problems. The courts are therefore faced with a reoccurring
question: What is the sex of a post-operative transsexual for the purpose
of marriage? Because most American states define marriage as between
only a "man" and a "woman," is a marriage like J'Noel's valid? What sex
is she? Without legislative help to answer these questions, courts have
come up with their own tests to resolve the disputes brought before
them. To define sex, some courts have focused purely on the chromoso-
mal makeup of the transsexual marriage partner at birth.7 In other words,
because J'Noel was born with male chromosomes, a penis and other
physical male characteristics, she is male and always will be. Other courts
have instead looked to science to develop a modern definition of sex
based on many factors, including sexual identity, sex hormones, internal
genitalia, and others. These contradictory conclusions have led to confu-
sion and uncertainty in this area of law.
Interestingly, the two approaches the courts are taking in the "defi-
nition of sex" area of the law reflects a debate often used in legal scholar-
ship, the rules versus standards debate. Legal scholarship throughout the
ages has asked how the choice of the form of a law will affect the law in
other, sometimes unintended, ways. The two forms, rules and standards,
exist at opposite ends of a form continuum. On the one hand, bright-line
rules offer a set law that is to be applied mechanically upon the occur-
rence of predetermined facts. For example, once a person has both an X-
chromosome and a Y-chromosome, he is a male, end of story. A stan-
dard, on the other hand, allows for more discretion on the part of the de-
cision-maker to apply context specific facts to a general legal policy.
Standards take many forms, including general policy guidelines and/or
directives to consider certain factors when determining what the law
should be. Courts choosing a standard in the sex-definition area, for ex-
ample, have determined sex based on a number of factors, including
gender identity, chromosomes, and sex assignment.
Given the increasing frequency of these types of cases reaching the
legal arena, it is important for courts to have the tools to adjudicate the
disputes efficiently, uniformly and in a way that promotes stability and
societal values. In this Note, I propose such a tool. More specifically, I
6. Id.
7. Other courts have used similarly rigid tests, relying instead on other factors such as external
genitalia. This Note will refer to all these rigid tests as "chromosome tests" for simplicity.
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will use the rules versus standards literature to aid in my analysis of what
the proper decision-making strategy of the courts should be. First, Part I
will highlight the current scientific understanding of gender identity dis-
order and the legal status of the transsexuals who suffer from it. In order
to understand the legal context of the debate, Part II will provide an
overview of the case law attempting to define sex for the purpose of
transsexual marriage. Part III goes on to offer a general description of
the rules versus standards debate and will also highlight some of the
theories that have been offered to explain the choice between a rule and
a standard. Part IV will pull out of the case law what general policies and
concerns the courts were attempting to further in choosing a definition of
sex. Part V will use the rules verses standards debate to discern whether
the two forms the courts have chosen do in fact further these policies.
Lastly, in Part VI, I propose that the proper form for a court to use to de-
fine sex is in fact a rule/standard hybrid. Based on current legal, social
and scientific policies, a standard should be utilized that allows a court to
define sex according to many factors, including genital, chromosomal,
and gender identity. However, in order to allow actors within society to
form relationships that they can expect the law to recognize, a more con-
crete rule is required. To that end, this paper proposes that a rebuttable
presumption be used in addition to the multi-factored standard. This au-
thor suggests as a possible presumption that when a transsexual under-
goes sex reassignment surgery after receiving a doctor's opinion that his
gender identity is incongruent with his physical sex, the court will pre-
sume, absent contradictory evidence, that the person's legal sex is that of
his congruent sex.
I. THE EXTERNAL CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE
A. DEFINING SEX: THE NEW SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING
Transsexualism is recognized by science as a medical condition re-
quiring treatment for relief. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual clas-
sifies transsexualism as "gender identity disorder," which occurs when
there is "a strong and persistent cross-gender identification" and
"[p]ersistent discomfort about one's assigned sex or a sense of inappro-
priateness in the gender role of that sex." 9 Medical science has recog-
8. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
580-82 (4th ed. 2000).
9. Id.
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nized that "many factors contribute to the determination of an individ-
ual's sex"" including,"
(i) Genetic or chromosomal sex-XY or XX;'2
(2) Gonadal sex -testes or ovaries;'
3
(3) Internal morphologic sex-seminal vesicles/prostrate or
vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes;4
(4) External morphologic sex- penis/scrotum or clitoris/
labia;'5
(5) Hormonal sex- androgens or estrogens;
6
io. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 278. I will call this definition of sex the "multi-factored ap-
proach."
ii. The list of factors is drawn from Greenberg, supra 5, at 278. The following footnotes will pro-
vide brief descriptions of these factors. For a more thorough explanation of the sexual elements of the
body and abnormalities that occur within these characteristics, see JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE
BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES (994).
12. Traditionally, males and females differ in respect to only one pair of the twenty-three chro-
mosome pairs that make up the nucleus of the human cell. BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 489 (39th ed.
I999). In the female nucleus, there are two X-chromosomes, while the male nucleus contains both an
X-chromosome and a Y-chromosome. Id. While this may be the "traditional" chromosome structure,
in reality, abnormalities occur more often than one would think. According to Black's Medical Dic-
tionary, "[albout one in two hundred live-born babies has an abnormality of development caused by a
chromosome and two-thirds of these involve the sex chromosomes." Id.
13. The "gonad" is a gland that produces either an ovary or a testes. Id. at 231. The gonad, which
appears in the fourth week of gestation, is originally "indifferent" in terms of specific sex. Id. In the
presence of a Y-chromosome, however, the gonad develops into a testes, giving the fetus a "male" go-
nadal sex. Id. This "gonadal differentiation" is considered the first stage of sexual development. Id.
The testes, which will descend into the scrotum as "testicles" before birth, is the organ that produces
the spermatozoa and the hormone testosterone (which is responsible for the development of the male
characteristics). Id. at 542. The ovaries produce the ova (egg cells) and certain hormones required for
menstruation. Id. at 403.
14. Considered the second stage of sexual development, the growth of internal genitalia occurs
after the development of the gonads. Id. at 231. Once the testes is formed, an "inducer" is produced,
which stimulates the development of the internal male organs, and suppresses that of the female inter-
nal organs. Id. Without the presence of the testes, the female organs will develop automatically. Id.
Fallopian tubes conduct the ova from the ovaries to the interior of the womb. Id. at 199. The uterus is
an organ "where the fertilized ovum (egg) normally becomes embedded and in which the embryo and
fetus develop." Id. at 573 (emphasis omitted). The vagina is the lower part of the female reproductive
tract through which the baby is delivered and through which sperm must travel to fertilize the ovum.
Id. at 577.
15. Traditionally referred to as the "genitalia," the external genital differentiation is the third
stage of sexual development. Id. at 231. It is again the androgens produced by the testes which stimu-
lates the development of external male organs, and suppresses the development of female organs. Id.
The penis is the male sexual organ that carries urine from the bladder and semen from the scrotum. Id.
at 418. The scrotum is the pouch of skin that carries the testicles. Id. at 485. The clitoris is the female
erectile organ which may be the focus of orgasm. Id. at to8. The labia are the folds of skin that sur-
round the entrance to the vagina. Id. at 303.
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(6) Phenotypic sex-facial and chest hair or breasts; 7
(7) Assigned sex and gender of rearing; 8 and
(8) Sexual identity. 9
Gender identity disorder is a condition where people "may be seem-
ingly harmonious in all of the first six factors, but do not identify them-
selves with the sex associated with these factors."2 In other words, the
transsexual's "biological sex," consisting of the first six factors, does not
conform to his or her "self-identified sex," or the eighth factor.' This is a
form of intersexuality, which exists when either "(I) [there is a] failure to
meet the typical criteria within any one factor; or (2) one or more factors
[are] incongruent with the other factors." '22
Although science has not yet definitively isolated a biological
"common denominator" that causes transsexualism, 3 research into a link
between the brain and gender identity "is providing new data at perhaps
geometrical rates."24 An example is a case study performed by Milton
Diamond and H. Keith Sigmundson, published in 1997, on an adult X
I6. Hormones are "chemical messengers" that produce effects in various parts of the body. Id. at
256. "Androgen" is the general term for a group of hormones, including testosterone, that govern the
development of male sexual organs and male secondary sexual characteristics. Id. at 28. Estrogens are
hormones that are responsible for the readiness of the uterus for menstruation and the development of
female secondary sexual characteristics. Id. at 395. Once the levels of androgens or estrogens increase
to adult levels, the male or female reaches "puberty," or the fourth and final stage of sexual develop-
ment. Id. at 231.
17. A person's phenotype is the characteristics that develop as a result of the interaction between
the person's genotype (all of her genetic information encoded in her chromosomes) and the environ-
ment. Id. at 225, 425. The phenotypic sex, therefore, is a general term encompassing the secondary
sexual characteristics that result from a sex-specific genetic structure. See id. at 425. The secondary
sexual characteristics are physical characteristics, such as breasts, pubic hair, facial hair and voice
changes, that develop during puberty. Id. at 486.
18. "Assigned sex" is a term of art in the medical community referring to the sex in which a
child's community has decided to rear him or her. MONEY, supra note ii, at 65. Because in some chil-
dren the many different variables of sex often cannot be classified as all "male" or all "female," society
chooses to rear these children in one or the other sex. Id. Sex assignment "is the product of a public
announcement, an official act through the signing of the birth certificate, and a reiterative routine in
all the daily acts of rearing that defines and stereotypes masculine and feminine roles and expectan-
cies." Id.
i9. Sexual identity, also called gender identity, is another term of art referring to the psychologi-
cal sex of a person. It refers to the body image that one has and the sexual role within which one feels
the most comfortable. While most people's body image is consistent with their other sexual character-
istics, this is not the case with transsexuals. See id at 85.
20. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 289 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 267.
22. Id. at 281.
23. Id. at 289.
24. William Reiner, To Be Male or Female- That Is the Question, i51 ARCHIvEs PEDIATRICS &
ADOLESCENT MED. 224, 224 (1997).
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male, John (Joan when living as female) who as a child had experienced
a traumatic loss of his penis at eight months." Scientists at the time, be-
lieving that gender was a product of assigned sex and gender rearing (fac-
tor seven above) recommended and performed sex reassignment surgery
26on the infant. According to the authors, John never accepted his as-
signed female sex.27 As a child, he preferred "boy" toys, played only with
his male peers, occasionally urinated standing up, and mimicked his fa-
ther's behavior rather than his mother s.,8 By fourteen, John confessed to
doctors his suspicion that he was really a male, and, after consultation,
sex reassignment surgery was deemed necessary and was in fact per-
formed.29 John was eventually accepted by his peers as a male, and is now
married and raising children with his wife.30 The core finding from this
study is that in John's case, anatomical sex was changed by hormones
and surgery, but his sexual identity remained fixed."
Studies such as Diamond and Sigmundson's on intersexual condi-
tions have led many in the medical community to believe that "the brain
'differentiates' in utero to one gender or the other and that, once the
child's brain has differentiated, that child cannot be made into a person
of the other gender simply through surgical alterations."3 As early as
1997, some scientists were reporting their beliefs that this differentiation
occurs due to "intrauterine androgen exposure," or hormone levels in
the womb.33 This hormonal exposure may "lead to the misassignment or
reassignment of sex at birth from the genetic sex. ' This supports the
theory that it is the brain, affected by different hormonal levels, that de-
termines sexual identity, and not one's external genitalia. One study
published in 2000 researched neuronal sex differences in the brain and
found that "in transsexuals sexual differentiation of the brain and geni-
tals may go into opposite directions and point to a neurobiological basis
of gender identity disorder." 6 The study found that transsexuals exhib-
25. Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long-Term Review and
Clinical Implications, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 298, 298-99 (1997).
26. Id. at 298-99.
27. Id. at 299.
28. Id. at 299-300.
29. Id. at 30.
30. Id. at 300.
31. See Reiner, supra note 24, at 224-25.
32. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 76 (Md. 2003); see also Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 25, at
303.
33. Reiner, supra note 24, at 224.
34. Id. at 225.
35. Id. at 224.
36. Frank P.M. Kruijver et al., Male-to-Female Transsexuals Have Female Neuron Numbers in a
Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2034, 2034 (2000).
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ited neuronal qualities in one section of the brain opposite that of their
physical sex. 37 These "neuronal differences" were found not to be "the
result of changes of sex hormone levels in adulthood," but were instead
"likely to have been established earlier during development." 8 The
above research furnishes "overwhelming" evidence that "humans are not
psychosexually neutral at birth but are ... predisposed and biased to in-
teract with environmental, familial, and social forces in either a male or
female mode."39 As one court has expressed, "[t]he ultimate conclusion
of such studies... is that the preeminent factor in determining gender is
the individual's own sexual identity as it has developed in the brain."' In
other words, while physical sex may be changed, sexual identity, estab-
lished most likely by the brain and not by chromosomes, is immutable."
B. THE LEGAL STATUS OF TRANSSEXUALS TODAY
The legal status of transsexuals in the United States and abroad is in
a state of flux. A transsexual diagnosed with gender identity disorder
may obtain sex reassignment surgery in all fifty states today.42 All states
but three-Idaho, Tennessee, and Ohio-allow transsexuals to change
their sex on their birth certificates. 3 Despite the fact that most jurisdic-
tions support gender transition, most states do not give transsexuals full
rights according to their reassigned sex, including the right to marry.'
Transsexuals are therefore forced into a "no man's land," where medi-
cine and social policy has accepted their psychological sex, yet the law re-
fuses to allow them to order their lives accordingly. Two scholars have
noted that
[t]o allow the operation in the first place, but then to deny it full legal
efficacy cannot, after all, be in anyone's interest: that of the subject,
that of the persons with whom he or she interacts, or that of the public
at large. In other words, it cannot be within that somewhat nebulous
concept, the public interest, to deny full legal effect to reassignment."
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2039.
39. Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 25, at 303.
40. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 77 (Md. 2003).
41. See Milton Diamond, Sex and Gender are Different: Sexual Identity and Gender Identity are
Different, 7 CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 320, 325 (2002).
42. See Shannon Minter, REPRESENTING TRANSSEXUAL CLIENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED LEGAL
ISSUES, at http://www.nclrights.org/publications/pubs/tgclients.pdf (last updated Mar. 2003).
43. LAMBDA LEGAL, AMENDING BIRTH CERTIFICATES TO REFLECT YOUR CORRECT SEX, at http://www
.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDAPDF/pdf/i6 9 .pdf (Nov. 12, 2002).
44. See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 298-99.
45. H.A. FINLAY & WILLIAM Aw. WALTERS, SEX CHANGE-THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEX RE-
ASSIGNMENT I 19 (1988).
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The effect of this contradiction cannot be overstated. For many, this
state of sexual limbo results in the denial of the right to marry, sex dis-
crimination in employment without equal protection, removal from ath-
letic events, changes in military obligations and rights, and the
emergence of liability for criminal sexual offenses. 46
Outside the United States, the legal status of post-operative trans-
sexuals is moving towards the ability to marry. The European Court of
Human Rights has noted that according to one study, "over the previous
decade there had been an unmistakable trend in the member states of
the Council of Europe towards giving full legal recognition to gender re-
assignment."47 The court also reported that twenty European countries,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine, permit a
post-operative transsexual to marry a person of their now-opposite sex."'
In fact, the European Court of Human Rights in the 2002 case of Good-
win v. United Kingdom held that England's refusal to recognize the con-
gruent sex of a post-operative transsexual for the purpose of marriage
violated her personal rights found in Articles 8"9 and 12 ° of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.' The court came to this
conclusion by deciding that while "[a] conflict between social reality and
law" causes "feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety," there are
"no significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of [a
transsexual] in obtaining legal recognition of her gender re-
assignment. 52 In other words, the court could find no support for the
theory that chromosomes determine a person's sex, especially consider-
ing the science now available linking transsexualism and the brain, and
the "wide international recognition [of transsexualism] as a medical con-
dition for which treatment is provided in order to afford relief."53 The
European legal recognition of the right of a transsexual to have his or her
sex officially designated as his or her reassigned sex indicates that the
current definition of sex is changing worldwide. The world community
has reassessed its policies in light of the growing understanding of the
transsexual experience.
46. See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 267 n.5.
47. Goodwin v. United Kingdom [2002] 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447,466 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002).
48. Id. at 467.
49. "'Everyone has the right to respect for his private... life."' Id. at 468.
50. "'Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, accord-
ing to the national laws governing the exercise of this right."' Id. at 478
51. Id. at 468, 478.
52. Id. at 473, 452.
53. Id. at 450.
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II. MODERN LEGAL APPROACHES TO
DETERMINING A TRANSSEXUAL'S SEX
We have so far looked into the political and scientific advancements
that have changed the way the world views the sex of transsexuals.
Within this context, a number of courts have been faced with the task of
finding a legal definition of sex. Each court in turn has decided to adopt
either a rigid test, such as the chromosome test, where a person's sex is
determined by her chromosomes, or a multi-factored approach, where a
number of factors may be considered to determine a person's sex under
the circumstances.54 It is important to see what normative factors lead to
this choice. By analyzing what the rationales were, one can determine
whether these rationales actually support the courts' choice.
A. THE BEGINNING OF THE DEBATE
Courts first began to confront the question of how to define a trans-
sexual's sex in the context of whether a person's sex could be changed on
her birth certificate. Not surprisingly, early cases in this area tended to
find that a person's sex is determined by the sex recorded on the birth
certificate. A New York Supreme Court case decided in 1966, Anony-
mous v. Weiner,55 is considered the "'first case in the United States to
deal with transsexualism.', 6 In Weiner, a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual was denied the ability to change her sex on her birth certifi-
cate because, according to the court, the sex designation was not an "er-
ror."57 The court deferred to the findings of the New York Board of
Health, which had previously determined, relying on a New York Acad-
emy of Medicine study, that sex at birth was the correct sex." The court
found that because "'[t]he syndrome of transsexualism' involves 'a truly
untrodden, controversial and largely unexplored field of medicine,"' it
would not substitute its own ideas for that of the agency's specialized
medical judgment. 9
Interestingly, multi-factored approaches can also be found in the
early sex-definition cases. Just two years after Weiner, a New York City
Civil Court decided the case of Matter of Anonymous," in which a post-
54. See discussion supra Part L.A for an example of the factors that may be considered in a multi-
factored approach.
55. 270 N.Y.S.2d 3I9 (i966).
56. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d i2o, 126 (Kan. 2002) (quoting In re Estate of Gardiner, 22
P.3 d Io86, ioo (Kan. Ct. App. 2001)).
57. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 320-24.
58. Id. at 321-23.
59. Id. at 320, 323 (quoting Harry Benjamin, Clinical Aspects of Transsexualism in the Male and
Female, i8 Am. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 458, 458 (1964)).
6o. 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968).
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operative male-to-female transsexual sought to have his name changed
to a female name." In deciding whether gender is always what society
deems it to be at birth or whether it is what the individual claims it to be,
the court noted that there are various intersexual conditions where soci-
ety has been proven wrong about the "true gender" of an individual.62
After assessing the scientific evidence of these known conditions, the
court concluded, "to say that the gender of an individual [is] that which
society says it to be... would be to disregard the enlightenment of our
times."' The court declined the opportunity to simply rely on old notions
of how sex was defined by the courts in the past.64 Instead, it set forth a
new test: "Where... with or without medical intervention, the psycho-
logical sex and the anatomical sex are harmonized, then the social sex or
gender of the individual should be made to conform to the harmonized
status."6' The support for the new test lay in the fact that older tests, in
light of new scientific evidence, simply did not work to determine the
correct sex for transsexuals. In an eloquent passage, the Matter of
Anonymous court explained why it would not simply accept old notions
of what sex meant:
Perhaps the easiest method of disposing of this application would be
merely to deny the petition on the grounds that the instant relief
prayed for has never before been granted by this or any other court of
this State. To do so would, in effect, sweep the problem under the pro-
verbial rug and defer the determination until some time "in fu-
turo." ... [A]ny difficulty presented herein is not so much the nature of
the problem itself, but in trying to apply.., static rules of law to situa-
tions such as that presented herein, which perhaps merit new rules
and/or progressive legislation.66
Lastly, the court dismissed any argument that the new test would
promote fraud.6' The court pointed out that the post-operative transsex-
ual was "anatomically and psychologically a female in fact" and that any
"so-called fraud... exists to a much greater extent" when a birth certifi-
cate continued to classify such individuals by their former gender.68 Mat-
ter of Anonymous shows that as early as i968, the definition of sex in the
law had begun to change from a rigid test to a more flexible approach.
6i. Id. at 835.
62. Id. at 836-37.
63. Id. at 836-38.
64. Id. at 837.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 836.
67. Id. at 838.
68. Id.
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A few years after Weiner, the English Probate, Divorce and Admi-
ralty Division decided the case of Corbett v. Corbett,69 in which it rejected
any attempt to define the sex of transsexuals as anything other than what
their sex was determined to be at birth.7" Although the case is not an
American decision, its effect on American transsexual case law was
sweeping, with many courts citing the case, and even depending on it for
foundation years later.' In Corbett, a non-transsexual male, Arthur,
sought to annul his fourteen day marriage to a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual, Ashley, whom he dated for three years, because, he
alleged, his wife was a man and because their marriage had never been
consummated." To decide the issue of whether Ashley was a male or a
female for the purpose of determining the validity of the marriage, the
court heard a great deal of expert testimony.73 While the Corbett court
recognized that science looked to psychological and hormonal factors as
well as physical factors to assess one's sex, it rejected the fact that these
factors were used to "determine sex."74 According to the court, these fac-
tors only helped to determine "'the sex in which it is best for the individ-
ual to live"' who is experiencing "sexual abnormalities."75 The court
thought that medical professionals only considered operation as a means
of making a person happy when their psychological sex happened to be
incongruent with their physical sex; therefore, any "operative interven-
tion" should be ignored when defining a person's sex.7 The court called
any scientific evidence done to prove a brain correlation to transsexual-
ism "purely hypothetical and speculative."77
After brushing science aside and determining that "the biological
sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth.., and cannot be
changed,""T the Corbett court, referring to the "heterosexual character"
of marriage, rejected the argument that anything but "biology" should
69. [1971] P. 83 (Eng. Prob., Divorce & Admiralty Division 1970).
70. Id. at io6.
71. See Katrina C. Rose, Sign of a Wave? The Kansas Court of Appeals Rejects Texas Simplicity in
Favor of Transsexual Reality, 70 UMKC L. REV. 257, 268 (2oo) (calling the case a "monumental
judgment" with influence that "cannot be understated"); see also In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120,
127-28, 133 (Kan. 2002).
72. [19711 P. 83,90-94 (Eng. Prob., Divorce & Admiralty Division 1970).
73. Id. at 97-99.
74. Id.
75. Id. at OO (basing this idea on the testimony of one expert medical witness, Professor C J
Dewhurst, FRCSE, FRCOG, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at Queen Charlotte's Hospi-
tal).
76. Id. at lo6.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 104.
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determine sex.79 The court stated that because "even the most extreme
degree of transsexualism in a... person with male chromosomes, male
gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally
capable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage," the
criteria for determining sex must be biological8'° Undeniably then, the
court based its decision to use only physical factors to determine sex on
the idea that a male-to-female transsexual cannot ever fulfill a woman's
role in marriage, to have children. The court did recognize that other ar-
eas of English law such as national insurance policy recognize a transsex-
ual's reassigned sex. However, the court denied the applicability of this
fact to the question before it, stating, somewhat cryptically, that, unlike
these other areas, "[m]arriage is a relationship which depends on sex and
not on gender.",
8
'
Considering that this case is based on an outdated construct of mar-
riage and over thirty-year-old inadequate scientific knowledge, it is unfa-
thomable that any modem court would use this case as a basis for its
decisions. Unfortunately, despite the fact that science now contradicts
the court's analysis, no English courts have been willing to overrule the
Corbett decision, "[foreclosing] any possibility of full recognition of gen-
der transition in England... until Parliamentary action. ,8
B. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP RESULTING IN A MULTI-FACTORED APPROACH
The first major American court to adopt a multi-factored approach
to defining sex was the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey, in the often cited case of M. T. v. J. T.8 In this case, decided in
1976, a post-operative male-to-female transsexual sought support and
maintenance from her non-transsexual male husband after their separa-
tion from their two-year marriage. 4 The couple had lived together for
seven years before marriage and had been together before and after the
wife's operation, which was funded by the husband."' The husband at-
tempted to defend against her claim by raising the defense of a void mar-
riage due to the wife's alleged "male" sex.86 The court first rejected the
79. Id. at io6.
8o. Id.
81. Id. at io7.
82. Rose, supra note 71, at 267. At the time of publication of this Note, the English Parliament is
considering the "gender recognition bill," which would give legal recognition of the "new gender" of a
transsexual. The transsexual would have to show that they have "lived in their new gender for at least
two years and that they intend to live that way until death." A Tweak in the Law for a Small But Vul-
nerable Minority, ECONOMisT, Nov. i5, 2003, at 54.
83. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
84. Id. at 205.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Corbett decision, stating that the evidence repudiated the notion that
one's physical and psychological sexes were "disparate phenomena," and
instead held that "a person's sex ... embraces an individual's... deep
psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character."8 The
court placed emphasis on medical opinions which stated that gender
identity was established firmly almost immediately after birth and that
physical sex was just one of many factors which were "relevant to the de-
termination of sex."' The court therefore found that a person's sexual
capacity "requires the coalescence of both the physical ability and the
psychological and emotional orientation to engage in sexual intercourse
as either a male or a female."' According to the court, the sexual nature
of marriage was paramount, and it found that "for marital purposes if the
anatomical or genital features of a genuine transsexual are made to con-
form to the person's gender, psyche or psychological sex, then identity by
sex must be governed by the congruence of these standards."'
Along with the scientific foundation, the M. T. court emphasized its
obligation to "promote the individual's quest for inner peace and per-
sonal happiness."9' Through science, the plaintiff had "become physically
and psychologically unified and fully capable of sexual activity consistent
with her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and anatomy," and thus
the court would accept her status as female.92 The court saw no "reason
grounded in public policy to prevent the person's identification at least
for purposes of marriage" to the post-operation sex.93 Implicitly, the
court in M. T rejected the Corbett view that marriage was based on pro-
creation, and focused instead on the important role of sexuality in mar-
riage. Because the transsexual could only fulfill this role in her post-
operative sex, the court would recognize her as a female, allowing her to
live "a 'fuller and richer life..' ' ..
In re Kevin,95 an Australian Family Court case decided in 2001, de-
serves attention as it was the first case to describe and rely upon modern
scientific advancements in the understanding of "sex," and has therefore
87. Id. at 208--09.
88. Id. at 205, 207.
89. Id. at 209.
9o. Id.
91. Id. at2i.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 21o--ii.
94. Id. at 206.
95. (2ooi) 28 Fam. L. R. 158 (Austi.), available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/judge/2ooi/pdf/
reKevin.pdf, affd, Commonwealth v. Kevin (2003) 30 Fam. L. R. i (Austl.).
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enjoyed deserved attention by United States decisions following it.96 In In
re Kevin, Kevin, a female-to-male transsexual, and Jennifer, a non-
transsexual female, sought a declaration by the Australian family court
of the validity of their marriage.' Kevin, who underwent all sex change
procedures except the construction of a penis or testes, had already been
issued a new birth certificate showing his sex to be male, and thereafter
married Jennifer, who knew of his sex change procedure?'
The court found that in past court decisions such as Corbett, "social
and psychological" factors to determine sex "have simply been assumed
to be irrelevant."' The court rejected that a woman's "natural" role in
marriage was to reproduce, noting this is the only reason to support the
assertion that non-biological factors should have been excluded.'" In the
absence of valid legal precedent, the court reviewed the rules of statutory
construction, using the then-present legal environment, international
case law, medical evidence and national policy to hold that
[tlo determine a person's sex for the purpose of the law of marriage, all
relevant matters need to be considered ... [including] the person's bio-
logical, psychological, and physical characteristics at the time of mar-
riage, including (if they can be identified) any biological features of the
person's brain that are associated with a particular sex.'
The In re Kevin court found that the words "male" and "female"
should be given their "ordinary contemporary meaning," and not the
"meaning they had at the time of the legislation."'0 ' The court noted that
defining the terms using the latter would not work in many situations.
For instance, "if the word 'vehicle' were found in legislation that pre-
dated the motor car, it might nevertheless be sensible to interpret it as
including a motor car."'" Also, there was no evidence to show that the
legislature, when it adopted the Australian marriage statute in I96i,
would have had in mind a biology-only definition of sex.'" No evidence
was put forth showing that the legislature considered transsexuals at all,
96. It should be noted that because In re Kevin was decided in 2OOl, it was not available for con-
sideration by the Littleton court. See discussion infra Part II.C.
97. In re Kevin, 28 Fan. L. R. 158, available at http:/Iwww.familycourt.gov.auljudge/2ool/pdfl
reKevin.pdf, at 2.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 25.
ioo. Id. 26-27.
toI. Id. at 86.
102. Id. at 5-6, 35, 37.
lO3. Id. at 35.
io4. Id.
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or that a "traditional" definition of sex would have included only biologi-
cal factors.
0 5
The court next reviewed the legal and social policy environment
finding support therein for a contemporary definition of sex that was not
biological factor exclusive. '°6 The court noted that Australian initiatives
recognizing a change of sex in criminal and discrimination law, as well as
in the law of sex on passports and birth documents, "support the view
that there is no insuperable objection to the law recognizing the changed
sex of a person who has undergone a sex reassignment procedure."'" The
court also noted that internationally, "the overall trend, reflected in judi-
cial decisions and other legal and administrative arrangements, is toward
increased understanding of transsexuals... reflected in a general ten-
dency to accept that for legal purposes, including marriage, post-
operative transsexuals should be treated as members of the sex to which
they have been assigned.""' Further there are important policy reasons
for recognizing the reassigned sex of post-operative transsexuals, includ-
ing "[respecting] the rights of the individual concerned [by] avoiding fur-
ther suffering, [marking] acceptance of people who are different,...
[assisting] the individuals to integrate into society... [and providing] a
convenient and workable line to draw for the law."'"
Lastly, the court devoted much time to exploring current medical
developments in the understanding of transsexualism." While the court
acknowledged that there was "still doubt" about the reasons for trans-
sexualism, it found that the evidence demonstrated that psychological
factors were as much biological as genital, chromosomal and gonadal fac-
tors."' The court stated that "[t]he difference is essentially that we can
readily observe or identify the genitals, chromosomes and gonads, but at
present we are unable to detect or precisely identify the equally 'biologi-
cal' characteristics of the brain that are present in transsexuals ..... After
reviewing much of the scientific evidence noted above,"3 the court found
that
It is obvious that current medical theory and practice is to support
[transsexuals] in assigning, or re-assigning their sex in accordance with
105. The court pointed out that the discovery of chromosomes did not occur until the 1950S, mak-
ing their inclusion into the "traditional" definition of sex illogical. Id. at 36.
io6. Id. at 71.
107. Id. at 46.
io8. Id. at 56.
IO9. Id. at 84.
iio. Id. at 71-72.
sit. Id. at7I.
112. Id.
113. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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their deeply-felt sense of themselves as men or women.... [I]f the law
were to insist on Kevin being treated as a woman, it would be contrary
to the most informed and authoritative medical practice.14
The In re Kevin court concluded that "'a woman or a female, as
those terms are generally understood in Australia today, includes a per-
son who, following surgery, has harmonized psychological and anatomi-
cal sex."' 5 The court would determine sex using a case-by-case analysis
considering matters such as biological, social, psychological, hormonal,
surgical and physical characteristics at the time of marriage and before.
6
It noted, however, that "[i]t is clear from the Australian authorities that
post-operative transsexuals will normally be members of their reassigned
sex."" 7
In the years following M. T. and Corbett, legal scholars began to par-
ticipate in the transsexual marriage debate. This scholarship provided a
vital link between courts and science, and gave judges valuable tools to
bring the law in line with the reality of the transsexual experience. Al-
though there were many such articles written before 1999 that courts may
have utilized, this Note will focus on one, a symposium article published
in the Arizona Law Review by Julie A. Greenberg. ' I8 Greenberg's article,
titled Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between
Law and Biology, represents one of the most influential articles to syn-
thesize scientific research, legal scholarship, and case law on the issue of
the definition of sex in the law. Many prominent cases have cited Green-
berg's article for its medical and scientific information"9 and legal conclu-
sions.' One court, which ultimately adopted a multi-factored definition
of sex, quoted fourteen full pages of the article, using it as one of its pri-
mary sources of "medical and scientific information .... ' According to
LEXIS/NEXIS, the Greenberg article has also been cited by researchers
in thirty-six articles since its publication.'22
114. In re Kevin (2001) 28 Fam. L. R. 158 (Austl.), available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/
judge/2ooi/pdf/reKevin.pdf, at 83.
I 15. Id. at 43 (quoting Sec'y of Dep't of Soc. Sec. v. SRA 0993) 118 ACR 467).
i16. Id. at 86.
117. Id.
i 8. Greenberg, supra note 5.
ii9. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d io86, IO93-iioo (Kan. Ct. App. 2oo1), rev'd, 42 P.3d 120
(Kan. 2002); In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 71-74 (Md. 2003); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Tex.
App. 1999).
i20. See Heilig, 816 A.2d at 72 (citing the theory that "sex/gender is not, in all instances, a binary
concept -all male or all female").
I. Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1093-I100.
122. This number derived from a LEXIS/NEXIS search conducted in 2003.
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In her article, Greenberg first showed that the binary concept of sex
(the theory that people are either one sex or another) is outdated and in-
correct.
23
Implicit in legislation utilizing the terms "sex" and "gender" are the as-
sumptions that only two biological sexes exist and that all people fit
neatly into the category male or female. In other words, despite medi-
cal and anthropological studies to the contrary, the law presupposes a
binary sex and gender model. The law ignores the millions of people
who are intersexed. A binary sex paradigm does not reflect reality. In-
stead, sex and gender range across a spectrum. Male and female oc-
cupy the two ends of the poles, and a number of intersexed conditions
exist between the two poles."4
Greenberg reported that "[m]illions of individuals are intersexed and
have some sexual characteristics that are typically associated with males
and some sexual characteristics that are typically associated with fe-
males."'25 She noted that scientists now consider transsexualism, where a
person's sexual identity does not conform to her "biological sex," a form
of intersexuality.126 She argued that the law, by using a binary system of
sex, ignores the reality that one's biological sex is not a simple indicator
of one's "true sex" for all humans.127 Furthermore, Greenberg reported
that scientific developments showed a link between gender identity dis-
order and the brain and demonstrated that one's sexual identity may be
immutable. ,8 Greenberg concluded that "[t]he law should not continue
to force intersexuals farther into the deepest recesses of their closet by
failing to acknowledge their existence and their self-identity.' ' .9
One of the first United States cases to cite Greenberg for her scien-
tific and legal findings was In re Estate of Gardiner, which was previously
discussed in the Introduction.'3 ° This case, decided in 2001 by the Kansas
Court of Appeals, ultimately adopted a multi-factored approach for de-
fining sex. When Gardiner was decided, many scholars praised the deci-
sion as "of major significance to transsexuals," being the first major case
since M. T in 1976 to utilize a modern approach to sex determination. 3'
Sadly, as explained below, this case would have no lasting effect, as it was
overturned on appeal by the Kansas Supreme Court.'32
123. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 275.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 267.
127. Id. at 275.
128. Id. at 271, n.25.
129. Id. at 327.
130. 22 P.3d lo86, rev'd, 42 P.3 d 120 (Kan. 2002).
131. Rose, supra note 71, at 261.
132. 42 P.3d 120, 136-37 (Kan. 2002).
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As discussed in the Introduction, Gardiner involved the 1998 mar-
riage of a post-operative male-to-female transsexual, J'Noel, to her hus-
band Marshall Gardiner, who was aware of J'Noel's gender history.'33
J'Noel successfully petitioned to have her sex changed to "female" on
her Wisconsin birth certificate in 1994, and was considered by her doc-
tors at the time to be a "fully... functioning, anatomical female."'3 4 Mar-
shall Gardiner died intestate in 199 9 after one year of marriage.'
Marshall's son Joe petitioned to be named Marshall's sole heir, claiming
that the marriage between his father and J'Noel was void as between two
men.
36
The court of appeals first explained why it would ultimately decide
to veer away from a chromosome test by pointing out that the under-
standing of transsexualism had changed too much to adhere to a rigid
"biological sex" framework:
Some cases lend themselves to precise definitions, categories, and clas-
sifications. On occasion, issues or individuals come before a court
which do not fit into a bilateral set of classifications .... It is not the
courts that have engendered the diverse composition of today's fami-
lies. It is the advancement of reproductive technologies and society's
recognition of alternative lifestyles that have produced families in
which a biological, and therefore a legal, connection is no longer the
sole organizing principle."'37
To help determine the definition of sex in the state's statute, the
court first looked to legislative history, finding that "nowhere is there any
testimony that specifically states that marriage should be prohibited by
two parties if one is a post-operative male-to-female or female-to-male
transsexual."'' 3 The court then determined that the question was one of
interpretation and looked to science, noting that "we know more and
more every year about this complex issue.... This case has the benefit of
some research which preceding cases on this issue did not."'39 The court
discussed in detail the medical evidence available before it, including
studies showing a connection between transsexualism and the brain.'4"
The court cited various scientific evidence showing that there was a
"neurological basis of gender identity disorder,' 4' and reviewed the
medical evidence of intersexuals who "fall outside of the normal male
133. Gardiner, 22 P.3d at io91-92.
134. Id. at 1092.
135. Id. at iogo.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993)).
138. Id. at 1093.
139. Id.
14o. Id. at 1093-94.
141. Id. at 1093 (quoting Kruijver et al., supra note 36, at 2034).
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chromosomes and genital pattern."'42 The court concluded that due to
this new scientific awareness of the causes of transsexualism, "'the legal
community must question its long-held assumptions about the legal defi-
nitions of sex, gender, male, and female."
43
The Gardiner court next reviewed case law, in particular, M. T. and
Littleton, a Texas case discussed below, and ultimately found that, in light
of the current medical evidence, M. T.'s multi-factored approach was the
more sound test.'" The court rejected the use of the chromosome test "as
a rigid and simplistic approach to issues that are far more complex than
addressed in the Littleton opinion. ' 4 Conversely, the court cited the
M. T. decision with favor, noting its replacement of "the biological sex
test with dual tests of anatomy and gender."'' 6 Finally, the court con-
cluded that a court must consider what the person's sex was at the time
of marriage, not simply what the person's chromosomes were at birth.'
47
Sex would be determined by considering what the court called the
"Greenberg factors," including, "chromosome makeup,... gonadal sex,
internal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phe-
notypic sex, assigned sex and gender of rearing, and sexual identity.'
' 48
The court of appeals further cautioned that this list was not exhaustive,
and that other criteria should be considered "as science advances.'
' 49
C. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP RESULTING IN A NARROW CHROMOSOME TEST
When confronted with the issue of defining sex in the context of
transsexual marriage, two often-cited modern cases settled on a rigid
chromosome test. These cases are Littleton v. Prange, decided in 1999 by
the Texas Court of Appeals,'5° and the Kansas Supreme Court's 2002 de-
cision in Estate of Gardiner.''
In Littleton, a post-operative male-to-female transsexual, Christie,
brought a medical malpractice suit against a doctor for the wrongful
death of her husband, who knew of Christie's sex change.'52 The doctor in
142. Id. at 1094-I 0. As noted above, the court of appeals in Gardiner quoted fourteen full pages
of the Greenberg article, using it to discuss intersexed conditions and the eight factors that are used to
determine sex. See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 278-92; see also discussion supra Part L.A for the sci-
ence available to the court.
143. Id. at i oo (quoting Greenberg, supra note 5, at 292).
44. ld. at II02, iio3, IIO5-O6.
145. Id. at Iio.
146. Id. at iio3, IIIO.
147. Id. at i Io.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 9 S.W-3 d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
151. 42 P.3 d 120, 135-36 (Kan. 2002).
152. 9 S.W.3 d at 224-25.
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his defense argued that the marriage was void as between two men, and
therefore Christie had no claim.'53
Surprisingly, despite all of the scientific and legal advances before it
for consideration, the court based its decision on legislative intent and
"divine will."' 54 The court argued that if the legislature wanted to allow
transsexuals to marry persons of their now opposite sex, they would have
articulated that specifically.'55 Even if this was not the case, it was clear to
the court that any changes made to the transsexual by reassignment were
"man-made," but at the core, sex is "immutably fixed by our creator at
birth.' 5 6 Using this religious dogma, the Littleton court brushed aside the
modem advances in law and science and blindly accepted the genital, go-
nadal and chromosomal tests, conveniently stating that defining
Christie's sex was not within the judiciary's "authority.' 57
The court in Littleton made a feeble effort to address the scientific
advances with which it was faced in making its decision. First, the court
rejected any argument that science might now consider a post-operative
transsexual to be of her reassigned sex.'58 The court called these "meta-
physical arguments" involving "matters of the heart.., beyond this
court's consideration."'59 In other words, the court did not address the
scientific advances at all, but instead classified these arguments as "socio-
logical philosophy.., involving desire and being, the essence of life and
the power of mind over physics." '6° It is reprehensible that a modem
court was able to dismiss science as, in essence, opinions no more worthy
than the mumblings of opinionated laymen. The Littleton court chose not
to address the studies referred to in the Greenberg article,'6 ' or to recog-
nize the opinions of physicians who testified at Christie's trial that medi-
cally, she was a woman.
The court avoided any further discussion of the definition of sex by
claiming that the issue was one of "first impression" regarding Texas
state law, and by ultimately deferring to the legislature.' 63 This argument
is ineffective as it ignores the fact that cases adopting a multi-factored
153. Id. at 225.
154. Id. at 224, 230.
155. Id. at 230.
156. Id. at 224, 231.
157. Id. at 230.
158. Id. at 231.
i59. Id.
i6o. Id.
161. The Greenberg article, supra note 5, was certainly before the court for consideration, as
pointed out by Justice Angelini in her concurrence in Littleton, 9 S-W.3d at 232.
162. Id. at 225.
163. Id. at 230.
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test were also interpreting state law. Contrary to the Littleton court's
opinion, those cases found it necessary to decide the issue of how to de-
fine a person's sex in light of modern advances and in light of the fact
that the legislature had not considered the issue, and thus had not fore-
closed it.' 64 Although the court in Littleton recognized the deep emo-
tional effects of transsexualism 66 and made no argument that the
legislature meant to foreclose a transsexual's ability to marry, the court
refused to factor this into its analysis. The Littleton court also failed to
address (or even mention) the scientific fact that something other than
physical anatomy, i.e. gender identity, may be more appropriate to define
sex for transsexuals.' 66
The failure of the court in Littleton to use or address any of these sci-
entific and legal tools in support of its finding makes the opinion rest on
shaky ground. No court can cite the opinion as support for anything
other than its emphatic belief that sex is a partly religious construct, im-
mutable after birth. Its finding that the legislature alone must address the
issue is flawed as it is based on an inapplicable legal proposition that a
court cannot "make law when no law exists." '67 In Littleton, law surely
did exist that allowed only marriages between one man and one
woman.'68 The courts are required to interpret the meaning of the terms
"man" and "woman" used in the statute, a responsibility of all judicial
authorities, recognized by the court in Littleton itself, but definitely ig-
nored.'"
The other major U.S. case to adopt a chromosome test was In re Es-
tate of Gardiner,'70 a case in which the Kansas Supreme Court overturned
the decision of the Court of Appeals to use a multi-factored approach.
The Supreme Court in Gardiner mentioned, but did not examine, many
of the arguments for developing a new test of sex partly by quoting a
large portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion.'7' The court briefly noted
Greenberg's analysis that "sexual identification is not simply a matter of
anatomy, as demonstrated by a number of intersex conditions," but did
not discuss any of the scientific studies and developments that the Court
164. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
165. The court does this implicitly when it refers to the issue as involving "matters of the heart"
and "desire and being, the essence of life and the power of mind over physics." Littleton, 9 S.W. 3 d at
231.
166. See M. T., 355 A.2d at 2o9.
167. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
168. See TEX. FAM. COoE ANN. § 2.ooi(b) (Vernon 1998).
169. Littleton, 9 S.W-3d at 230.
170. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3 d 120, 135-36 (Kan. 2002).
171. Id. at 126-31.
[Vol. 55:13291350
May 2004] HYBRID APPROACH TO TRANSSEXUAL'S SEX
of Appeals specifically reviewed.'72 As the Littleton court did, the Su-
preme Court in Gardiner attempted to remain sympathetic, recognizing
"that there are people who do not fit neatly into the commonly recog-
nized category of male or female, and to many life becomes an ordeal."'73
However, the court refused to address any of the implications of these
facts, declaring that "the validity of J'Noel's marriage to Marshall is a
question of public policy to be addressed by the legislature and not by
this court."'74 The Gardiner court ignored the argument put forth by the
court in M. T., that it had an obligation to allow transsexuals to live a full
life when no public policy is harmed.'75 The Gardiner court also, by refer-
ring to the definition of sex as simply a matter of "public policy," implic-
itly placed medical developments in the understanding of intersexual
conditions in the realm of "sociological philosophy," much as the Little-
ton court did.'7 6 The Gardiner court clearly stated the facts of and tests
developed by M.T.,7' the Court of Appeals in Gardiner,I,8 and In re
Kevin."' Conveniently, however, the court avoided countering any of
these arguments, relying in the end on a questionable interpretation of
legislative intent.
The Supreme Court in Gardiner held that the legislature intended to
preclude transsexuals from marrying members of their reassigned sex.'8,
To support this theory, the court relied on legislative history and "com-
mon meaning." First, the court stated that Senate Committee legislative
history revealed an explicit intent to "affirm the traditional view of mar-
riage" by limiting marriage to two parties of the opposite sex and declar-
ing that "all other marriages are against public policy and void."' 8'
Although the court acknowledged that the legislature did not consider a
transsexual's ability to marry, it viewed "the legislative silence to indicate
that transsexuals are not included. '' 1s If the legislature intended to in-
clude transsexuals, it could have done so.83 The court interpreted this
172. Id. at 132. For a review of the Greenberg analysis, see discussion supra Part I1.B. See also su-
pra notes 130-149 and accompanying text for the Gardiner Court of Appeals' scientific analysis.
173. Id. at 137.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 124; M.T., 355 A.2d at 210-II.
176. See supra notes i58-16o and accompanying text.
177. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 128-29. The court reviewed the facts of the M. T. case, and stated its test
that sex is determined by the congruence of anatomical and psychological sex.
178. Id. at 133.
179. Id. at 133-34. Here again, the court stated the facts of the Kevin case and its resulting test that
"the law should treat post-operative transsexuals as members of their reassigned sex." Id. at 134.
18o. Id. at 135-36.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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evidence to mean that "the legislature clearly viewed 'opposite sex' in
the narrow traditional sense" which, in its opinion, did not include trans-
sexuals. 84
The Gardiner court's legislative history interpretation lacks merit for
a number of reasons. First, the court did not explain why "the narrow
traditional sense" of opposite sex did not include transsexuals. In fact, it
did not mention the arguments of either the Kevin court or the Court of
Appeals in Gardiner, which explicitly rejected this argument. ' Most im-
portantly, the Supreme Court in Gardiner conspicuously ignored the
Court of Appeals' finding that the purpose of the Kansas amendment re-
stricting marriage to members of the opposite sex was to address the is-
sue of homosexual marriage, not to attempt to define sex.'6 Simply
because the legislature "meant to void any marriage between members
of the same sex," and referred to anything else as "contrary to the public
policy" of Kansas, did not require the court to assume that post-
operative transsexuals should not be considered members of their reas-
signed sex.8" The Kansas Supreme Court's "against public policy" argu-
ment is also undermined by the fact that transsexuals in Kansas may
receive sex change operations and also, through an administrative proc-
ess, amend their birth certificates in the event of sex reassignment.'8 This
indicates that it was the policy of the state to validate a transsexual's re-
assigned sex, but the court did not consider this argument.
Even if no legislative intent were found to define sex as excluding
reassigned sex, the Supreme Court in Gardiner insisted that the common
meaning of "'sex,' 'male,' and 'female' in everyday understanding [did]
not encompass transsexuals" but instead "contemplate[d] a biological
man and a biological woman.""'8 The Supreme Court decided that a
male-to-female transsexual did not fit in the common definition of "fe-
male" because there was no ability to produce offspring, no womb, cervix
or ovaries, or any change in chromosomes.'" The court found support for
this "common definition" in law dictionaries and in the Littleton court's
finding that all aspects of the reassigned sex in the transsexual are man-
made.'9' In light of the scientific evidence that sex may now be defined
differently than it is in these dictionaries, as noted by the Court of Ap-
184. Id.
185. See In re Kevin (2OO) 28 Farn. L. R. 158 (Austl.), available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/
judge/2ooi/pdf/reKevin.pdf, at 22.
186. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d io86, 1092 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
187. Id. at 1093.
188. LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 43.
189. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2oo2).
19o. Id.
191. Id.
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peals, the Supreme Court's reliance on law dictionaries and its refusal to
address the scientific developments is unjustifiable. Also, the Supreme
Court's dependence on Littleton is unsound because Littleton made find-
ings based on religious dogma and a shaky interpretation of legislative
intent similar to the one presented in Gardiner."
III. THE RULES V. STANDARDS DEBATE
The above analysis of the case law reveals two main approaches that
modem courts have used to define sex for the purpose of transsexual
marriage. As we have seen, some courts chose to use a narrow chromo-
some test, while others adopted a more flexible multi-factored approach.
After reviewing this case law, it is striking to see the similarities between
these two tests and the two forms involved in the historical rules versus
standards debate. Almost every area of the law has seen a scholarly de-
bate over which form choice would best further the purposes of the law.
Some of these areas include law and economics," property, child cus-
tody,95 speech I 6 and voting rights, just to name a few.' 9 The sex defini-
tion courts have also unwittingly entered this debate. By choosing to use
either a rule (sex = chromosomes) or a standard (sex = the result of
multi-factored balancing), these courts are making a choice of form. To
decide whether the rationales used in the transsexual marriage cases
support these choices, we must consult the general rules versus standards
debate.
A. DEFINING RULES AND STANDARDS
Before the theories behind form choice are presented, it is helpful to
have a general knowledge of the distinction between rules and standards
and the debate between the two. As explained above, rules and stan-
dards are simply two possible forms in which laws may be set. A rule at-
tempts to set out a specific law that is to be applied mechanically in all
situations. A standard, on the other hand, attempts to apply a general
192. See supra notes 150-169 and accompanying text.
193. See Eric A Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y Tot (997);
Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Economics Law and Psychology: Behavioral Analysis and Legal
Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000).
194. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
195. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215 (1991).
196. See David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate Be-
tween Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS. L.J. 829
(1993).
I97. See Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy,
37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (2002).
198. Id. at 74.
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policy in each situation, giving the decision-maker greater discretion in
deciding how the law should be applied in each case. Although the two
forms are often referred to as mutually exclusive, in reality, legal com-
mands often are a mix of both." 9
An example here is in order. Consider an attempt to set a voting age
requirement."° Assume that the lawmaker is interested in ensuring that
those voters who are mature enough to be able to make important and
weighty decisions are allowed to vote. A rule setting the minimum voting
age at eighteen will surely screen out some immature voters, and allow
most of the mature voters the right to vote. However, such a generally
applied rule is both over- and under-inclusive. This mechanically applied
rule will also entitle immature voters over eighteen to vote, and screen
out those under eighteen who are mature enough to participate. Another
solution is to give the registrar the power to determine ability to vote,
based on maturity, in each circumstance. This standard-based approach
will produce better decisions because the registrar can tailor it to the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, thereby ensuring that the purposes of
the rule are advanced in each case, not simply in the majority of them.
However, the registrar in this standard may be tempted to use arbitrary
or discriminatory practices in its decision-making. Such abuses will also
create a danger that the purposes of the law will not be promoted.
Various authors have attempted to distinguish a rule from a stan-
dard. One author points to the fact that rules give content to the law be-
fore individuals act, whereas standards allow the law to be defined after
action.2"' In the voting age example, the law sets out in advance what
"maturity" is, it is reaching age eighteen. In order to vote, it is clear to
everyone that they must first reach eighteen. A standard, on the other
hand, does not tell the potential voter in advance exactly what is required
of her. In fact, this will not be decided until the potential voter attempts
to register to vote. Only then, after the potential voter has acted in what
she hopes is a mature fashion, will the registrar determine whether she is
indeed "mature" under the circumstances.
Another author, Pierre Schlag, explains the difference by pointing
out that the two forms have different "triggers" and "responses .... Every
law identifies some action or inaction, the "trigger," that results in some
legal consequence, the "response.""2 3 A pure rule has "a hard empirical
199. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561 (992).
200. This example is derived from MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15 (1987).
201. Kaplow, supra note 199, at 560.
202. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379,381-83 (1985).
203. Id.
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trigger and a hard determinate response."" In other words, the trigger is
objectively measurable, and carries a predetermined, set response. A
standard, on the other hand, "has a soft evaluative trigger and a soft
modulated response."2 5 Therefore the response depends on the court's
assessment of the trigger. The author cites a helpful example. A rule stat-
ing that "sounds above 70 decibels shall be punished by a ten dollar fine"
has a measurable trigger, sounds over 70 decibels, and a set response, ten
dollars.26 It is clear that when the sound rises above 70 decibels, there
will be a ten dollar fine. A standard might instead state that "excessive
loudness shall be enjoinable upon a showing of irreparable harm."2"
Here, the determination of whether there has been a trigger, i.e. "exces-
sive loudness" creating "irreparable harm" will decide if a response is
appropriate.
B. CHOOSING BETWEEN THE Two FORMS
Knowing now what "rules" and "standards" are, which form is more
appropriate for a court to use to define sex? The literature debating the
proper choice of form is complex and extensive.29 This historical debate
has lead to the development of various methods by which a decision-
maker might choose between the two forms.2" The following analysis will
highlight some of the most prominent methods.10
i. Virtues and Vices
Most commonly, the choice between a rule and a standard occurs by
balancing the "virtues and vices" of each form.2"' According to this
method, "the choice between adopting a rule or a standard is a choice be-
tween competing virtues and vices that we typically associate either with
rules or standards .... This theory represents a circular debate between
204. Id. at 382.
205. Id. at 383.
2o6. Id.
207. Id.
208. Because of the extensive nature of this debate, it is beyond the scope of this Note to highlight
and compare each theory regarding the choice of form. I chose various theories based on their appli-
cability to the definition of sex issue and the interesting questions they raised within this issue. See the
articles by Posner and Korobkin, supra note 193, for a different look into the economic efficiency and
behavioral science perspectives of the debate.
209. Much of this section highlighting some of the theories behind the choice of form is developed
based on the work of Pierre Schlag in his article, Rules and Standards, supra note 202. As I could not
cite each time his research has lead to my discovery of the information contained in this section, I
would like to acknowledge his general contribution hereto.
210. While each of these theories has been extensively debated and questioned, it is beyond the
scope of this Note to outline the entire rules versus standards debate. For a thorough critique of many
areas of the debate, see Schlag, supra note 202.
211. Schlag, supra note 202, at 383, 400-18.
212. Id. at 400.
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flexibility and certainty, uniformity and individualization, and between
various other competing values. Each of these qualities are considered
valuable results from a choice of one of the forms.1 3 These values, how-
ever, are each associated with a vice."4 For example, flexibility may not
be proper when there is great concern about the manipulation of the law,
and uniformity is unwise when the law would be over- or under-inclusive.
When choosing between a rule and a standard, legal scholars will often
break down the choice to a normative decision about which "virtues and
vices" are most appropriate for a given legal situation. x5 In other words,
what virtues best promote, and alternatively what vices most hinder, a
law's given objectives?
The virtues and vices debate has, through time, developed common
arguments about the values and faults of each form. On the one hand,
rules promote certainty, uniformity, stability, finality, predictability and
security."6 However, these virtues are associated with intransigence,
regimentation, rigidity, and closure."7 Likewise although standards have
certain virtues, including flexibility, individualization, open-endedness
and dynamism, they also inevitably provoke concerns about manipulabil-
ity, disintegration, indeterminacy and adventurism.28 Again, the choice
between rules and standards in this context "depends upon which com-
peting virtues (certainty or flexibility) are desired most, or similarly,
which alternative vices (rigidity or indeterminacy) are dreaded most.' '1 9
2. The Lesser of Two Evils
One scholar, Frederick Schauer, suggests that the choice of form
should be guided by a case-by-case analysis of the built-in errors of both
rules and standards.2 Standards are more likely to be misapplied due to
a misguided decision-maker, either by a lack of understanding or by
bias." ' Schauer explains that judges applying a flexible standard have
more opportunity to manipulate that standard to cater to his or her own
internal or legal biases, "whether through unconscious bias or conscious
ill-will .... Also, the more factors the decision-maker is expected to take
into account, because of the general limitations on human capacity, "the
213. Id. at 399.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 400-01
216. Id. at 400.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 399-4o1.
220. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 149-52 (1991).
221. Id. at 150-51.
222. Id. at 15o.
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greater the likelihood of confusion, miscalculation, or misunderstanding
as numerous factors are evaluated and weighed."23 Either of these sce-
narios leads to a decision that is more likely to deviate from the original
purposes of the law. 24 Rules, on the other hand, are most likely to fail by
being unable to reach the very best decision in each and every case. 25
Schauer explains that the errors of rules are produced not by the deci-
sion-maker, but by real life.2 6 "[F]or life, unlike the factual predicate of a
rule, is probabilistic and not universal, variable and not fixed, fluid and
not entrenched. As the complexity of experience clashes with the sim-
plicity of a rule, errors are produced even when rules are applied consci-
entiously.""' 7
Schauer proposes that a form should be chosen based on which type
of error-the misguided decision-maker or inaccurate application-is
more serious or more likely in any given legal context:
Where decision-makers are likely to be trusted, and where the array of
decisions they are expected to make will contain a high proportion of
comparatively unique decision-prompting events with serious conse-
quences if they are decided erroneously, we might expect the rule-
based mode to be rejected, or at least its stringency tempered. But
where there is reason to distrust a set of decision-makers with certain
kinds of determinations, and where the array of decisions to be made
seems comparatively predictable, errors of rule-based under- and over-
inclusion are likely to be less prevalent than decision-maker errors, and
consequently the argument for rules will be stronger."s
In other words, Schauer proposes that the choice between either a
rule or a standard comes down to choosing between the lesser of the two
inherent evils. Schauer further explains that the choice of a rule is "an
application of the theory of the second-best.""2 9 The rule, which is de-
signed to produce the overall best results, should only be used when the
standard, which is designed to find the best decision in each case, pro-
duces a higher incidence of errors then the general rule would produce."'
The basic theory is an easy one: whichever form will produce the very
best decision in the greatest amount of cases should be chosen.
Schauer's theory can be explored using an example of drafting a
noise control law. 3' First, assume that the objectives behind the law are
223. Id.
224. Id. at 149-50.
225. Id. at 149.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 152.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. As cited above, this example is derived from Schlag, supra note 202, at 381-83.
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to deter loud noises that are disruptive of the peace, without unnecessar-
ily hindering the entertainment and noise-making ability of the citizens.
A rule, that "sounds above 70 decibels shall be punished by a ten dollar
fine," of course carries with it the possibility that it will be over-and un-
der-inclusive. Not all sounds over seventy decibels are undesirable, and
sometimes, sounds much quieter can have a greater impact on the peace.
A union strike, for example, can get quite heated, but the rule based-
approach would penalize the conduct without a look at the speech rights
of the strikers or the beneficial effects of the noise. A standard, on the
other hand, that "excessive loudness shall be enjoinable upon a showing
of irreparable harm," carries its own possibilities of error. What is "ex-
cessive" must be determined by the judge in each circumstance. With no
guidance as to what "excessive" means, a judge may be free to apply the
law in a bias manner, for example, enjoining a union strike as excessive,
but not a loud out-door religious service.
Schauer would propose that a decision-maker choose between these
two forms by weighing which of the two evils, over- or under-inclusion or
possible bias are more likely or more serious. Is there a history of judges
proving to be biased against certain types of speech in the jurisdiction in
question? Is the speech that might be penalized protected by other
rights? Each of these questions should be answered based on the circum-
stances surrounding the decision, remembering that an optimal position
would be to favor the very best decision in as many cases as possible.
3. The "Epistemological Twist"
Another tool offered to facilitate the choice between forms is what
Pierre Schlag calls the "epistemological twist" in his article, Rules and
Standards.3' This theory holds that when we have imperfect knowledge
about the information affecting an issue, standards are most appropri-
ate.233 Schlag cites one author, Charles Curtis, as a foundation for this
theory."3 Curtis, in his article, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation,
argues that a lawmaker's "words should be as flexible, as elastic, indeed
as vague, as the future is uncertain and unpredictable." 3' Curtis argues
that because legal directives are in reality attempts to control the future,
they can only do this to the extent that the future is a known entity,, 6 In
reality, however, Curtis notes that "what happens in the future is neces-
232. Id. at 424. Note: epistemology is the study of the grounds and limits of knowledge. MEIuAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 391.
233. Schlag, supra note 202, at 424.
234. Id. at 399 n.59.
235. Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L REV. 407,424 (1950).
236. Id. at 423-24.
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sarily uncertain, inchoate, contingent, only partly foreseeable." '237 If un-
known situations may be encompassed within the application of a law, a
decision-maker must be given the discretion to apply the law to these
facts.38 Therefore, Curtis argues, a lawmaker must use "imprecise"
words, or, in other words, standards. 39 According to Curtis, then, if the
lawmaker hopes to control future unknown conduct, a vague standard
should be written. The lawmaker will consequently delegate to the deci-
sion-maker the proper authority to consider these new facts. If, on the
other hand, the lawmaker knows with certainty what types of situations
will occur and, within those situations, what types of conduct he does not
want to enable, a more precise rule will reach his purposes.
In his critique of Curtis's theory, Schlag argues that it is only the lack
of certain kinds of knowledge that will lead to the choice of a standard.24
In particular, Schlag points out that "when we have difficulties evaluating
the normative character of actions (but agree about values), we are more
likely to use standards. By contrast, when we lack knowledge (or consen-
sus) about normative values, we are more likely to cast directives in the
form of rules. 24 In other words, if we lack knowledge about the values
underlying a rule, but know what kinds of facts are likely to arise under
it, a rule is most appropriate. If, however, we are unsure of what fact
situations are likely to arise, but generally agree on the policies underly-
ing the law, a standard is advised. Schlag's limitation reflects the legal
system's hesitancy with delegating a legislative function to the judicial
branch. In general, we are comfortable with giving a judge the task of
applying a set policy to a certain fact situation, but hesitate to allow the
judge to set the policy herself.
4. Strategic Choice to Support a Substantive End
"Form is never purely form, but an anticipation of substance.
2 4
Some legal scholars have argued that when decision-makers participate
in form arguments, in reality, they will pick the form that will help them
reach a certain legal or philosophical end. The most influential of these
theories was developed by Duncan Kennedy, in his article Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication.43 Kennedy argued that the
choice of form is intimately connected with one's substantive political vi-
237. Id. at 424.
238. Id. at 424-25.
239. Id. at 425.
240. Schlag, supra note 202, at 425.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 419.
243. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(I976).
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sion.2 4 A rule expresses the ideals of individualism and self-reliance
while the standard furthers an opposite altruistic ideal.245 A helpful way
to understand Kennedy's claim is by looking at it through the lens of con-
tract law, which uses both rules and standards. 6 On the one hand, a
standard in contract law requires that parties refrain from entering into
unconscionable contracts, "ensuring that we don't take advantage of im-
provident fellow contractors." '247 A separate law also dictates that a judge
look not for a "substantively fair bargain," but only for formal considera-
tion." This strict rule favors self-ordering, and "allows us to celebrate
when we find a chump to contract with." 9
Kennedy argued that rules, through their certainty and general ap-
plication, allow individuals to take control of the direction of their
lives. 5 Because rules allow advanced planning, an individualist feels that
"people ought not to rely on their fellows or on government when things
turn out badly for them.. 5 When a rule is under-inclusive, "we should
not feel too badly about it, because those who suffer have no one to
blame but themselves." '252 On the other hand, the altruist prefers that the
law ensure that "the good man is secure in the expectation that if he goes
forward in good faith, with due regard for his neighbor's interest as well
as his own, and a suspicious eye to the temptations of greed, then the law
will not turn up as a dagger in his back." '253 In other words, an altruist
wants to reward not cunning, but good faith, a state of mind which is
most ascertainable through a standards-based approach.
Scholars have emphasized the substantive motives behind form
choices from other angles. While they are too numerous to document ex-
haustively, a few examples are worth noting. First, some feminist scholars
have claimed that the different forms appeal to separate male and female
traits."' For example, one scholar notes that males are associated with
"rule orientation, generalization, and nonaccommodating egotism,"
while "women speak in 'a different (moral) voice,' one that seeks ac-
244. Id. at 1776.
245. Id.
246. This example is derived from KELMAN, supra note 20o, at 55.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Kennedy, supra note 243, at 1738-39.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1739.
253. Id. at 1773-74.
254. See KELMAN, supra note 200, at 59.
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commodation among affected parties based in norms of situation-specific
fairness."255 Kelman explains that
[r]ules appeal to the aesthetics of precision, to the psychology of denial
or skeptical pragmatism (or, alternatively, of blinding ourselves to im-
precision and mistakes or believing it is girlishly utopian to hope for
perfection); standards appeal to the aesthetics of romantic absolutism,
to the psychology of painful involvement in each situation, to the
pragmatism that rejects the need for highfalutin generalities.56
According to these arguments, we can conclude that males and females
will be drawn to rules and standards, respectively, because of inherent
differences in their visions of the world.
Other authors suggest a more calculated subjective motive behind
the choice of form. In Joseph Grodin's article, Special Report on Califor-
nia Appellate Justice: Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?,57 he sug-
gests that the choice between a rule and a standard is partly a choice
designed to "favor the protection of certain interests over others. '258 He
points out that one scholar, Professor Kelso, favors any choice of form
which will act to cut the plaintiff's chance for recovery and will therefore
unburden the courts. ' Kelso therefore favors "rules" in situations in
which certainty and predictability mean that there is less of a chance for a
plaintiff to win, and therefore, less incentive to litigate. This choice of
form is made in order to get to a certain legal end, not simply because the
form happens to be congruent with the lawmaker's personal philosophy.
Frederick Schauer, in his book, Playing by the Rules 6° suggests that
the use of rules also "reflects the extent of decisional conservatism within
the system.'',6' He notes that rules "serve as institutions to preserve the
past," providing decision-makers with the ability in the present to "do
what would otherwise be politically or psychologically impossible.
'216
Schauer explains that when the legal system embraces rules
they embrace as well those values of intertemporal consistency...
stability for stability's sake, unwillingness to trust decision-makers to
depart too drastically from the past, and a conservatism committed to
the view that changes from the past are more likely to be for the worse
than for the better.63
255. See id. at 313 n.124 (citing the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan).
256. Id. at 61.
257. Joseph R. Grodin, Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 570 (1994).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. SCHAUER, supra note 220.
261. Id. at 173.
262. Id. at 173-74.
263. Id. at 174.
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According to Schauer, the decision to adopt rules is based in part on
one's desire to entrench the legal system in the laws of its "better days,"
when one feels that the likely changes are simply not good law.
IV. POLICY GOALS BEHIND MARRIAGE REGULATION
It will be helpful to review the polices behind a law defining sex for
marriage in order to determine how these policies relate to the rules and
standards debate. As the legal analysis above shows, the sex definition
issue has arisen in various family law contexts, from child custody to
property distribution. In Corbett, the court was asked to decide if the
marriage could be annulled, while the M. T court was faced with the
question of spousal support. Kevin reached the direct question of the va-
lidity of the marriage, while in Littleton, the court had to decide if the
plaintiff was entitled to bring a wrongful death action. Lastly, Gardiner
was a case about inheritance rights. In order to reach the broader ques-
tion, however, each court had to define sex in order to determine the va-
lidity of the marriage in the case.
The wide variety of cases cited here demonstrates the inherent diffi-
culty in any attempt to determine one set of uniform policies underlying
marriage, or any family law. "Translating a sense of shared values into
public policy and legal norms in the family law arena has never been an
easy matter."'64 Because marriage affects so many aspects of peoples'
lives, it is no wonder that the values underlying it are complex and var-
ied.
Keeping this inherent difficulty in mind, it is still possible to high-
light the various concerns these courts had when they chose a particular
form. As the legal analysis above shows, the cases which decided upon a
rule to determine sex were ultimately concerned with the formulation
and protection of expectations, the preference for a uniform law, limiting
judicial discretion, and guiding people towards morally acceptable con-
duct. The cases which adopted a standard to define sex were interested in
reflecting social and scientific change, maximizing individual happiness,
reflecting current public policy, protecting the family unit, protecting ex-
pectations and taking into account the diversity of the circumstances of
those who want to marry.
The most important concern of the courts that ultimately adopted a
standards-based test seemed to be the need to focus on the rapid changes
in science and in the social understanding and acceptance of the trans-
sexual. The first case to note this concern was In re Anonymous, which
264. Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Fami-
lies, i8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1306 (1997).
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refused to find that sex is always determined at birth, because that would
"disregard the enlightenment of our times. '265 Indeed, these courts have
found it to be their duty, in the absence of a contrary direction from the
legislature, to interpret legislation in light of the current social and scien-
tific reality. This is a reflection of the interpretation maxim that courts
are required to interpret the laws to reflect their "ordinary contemporary
meaning." In each of these cases, to find the "ordinary contemporary
meaning," the courts exhaustively studied the purposes of the marriage
statues and "the current legal, social and medical environment. '266
The court in Kevin noted that legal recognition of reassigned sex
would also help to "assist individuals to integrate into society. ' '2 More
specifically, by allowing transsexuals to order their personal lives through
reassignment, and yet refusing to give this sex legal effect, rule-based
courts in effect delegate transsexuals to legal "nothingness." The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, in the Goodwin decision, noted that it was
"struck by the fact that ... gender reassignment which is lawfully pro-
vided is not met with full recognition in the law, which might be regarded
as the final and culminating step in the long and difficult process of trans-
formation which the transsexual has undergone. '' 68
The rule courts, on the other hand, were mainly concerned with
leaving policy questions to the legislatures to decide. Inevitably, in each
case, the courts held that the judiciary should not have the discretion to
decide the law. These arguments are reflected in the Gardiner court's
statement, "[i]f the legislature intended to include transsexuals, it could
have done so."'69 While purporting to stay on an objective high-ground,
the chromosome courts were at the same time defining moral conduct.
These courts made it clear that, according to the legislatures, only "tradi-
tional" unions were acceptable. However, the lack of legislative direction
on the matter inevitably lead the courts themselves to define what "tradi-
tional" meant. To the chromosome courts, this did not include people
with incongruent gender conditions.27
Lastly, an important policy reflected in all of the cases was the pro-
tection of the expectations of the parties who entered into the marriage.
In each case reaching this issue, the non-transsexual in the relationship
knew about, and often encouraged, his or her spouse's sex reassignment.
265. In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968).
266. In re Kevin, 28 Faro. L. R. 158 (Austl. 2001), available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/
judge/2ooI/pdf/reKevin.pdf.
267. Id.
268. Goodwin v. United Kingdom 2 FCR 577,67 BMLR 199, *13 (Eur. Ct. of H.R. 2002).
269. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (Kan. 2002).
270. See id. at 136-37.
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The courts' opinions reflect the need to protect the good faith arrange-
ments that the parties have made as well as the need to help the parties
develop plans that will be upheld by the law.
V. USING A RULE OR A STANDARD TO DEFINE SEX
So far, this Note has highlighted the relevant arguments for and
against standards and rules and the policies behind the law of marriage.
Now, this Note will determine whether the policies favored by the courts
are actually furthered by their choices of form. Also, according to the
rules versus standards theories, this Note will determine what test a court
should use to define sex.
The virtues and vices language would be a good start to this analysis
considering the fact that this dialogue is the most commonly used in legal
discourse. First, to focus on the virtues of the chromosome rule. The
rule's virtues, namely uniformity, stability, predictability, finality and se-
curity, line up quite nicely with some of the possible concerns of. the
chromosome rule courts. In particular, the concern is that without a clear
rule, transsexuals will, in essence, never know where they stand. This
Note also finds some merit in this argument. While it is in the best inter-
est of a transsexual to be able to marry the person they wish, without a
clear rule, the transsexual may be worse off by not knowing how to ac-
complish this feat. For example, take the holding of the Court of Appeals
in Gardiner, which stated that courts should determine sex looking at a
number of factors, including, but not limited to, "chromosome
makeup .... gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, external morphologic
sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex and gender of rearing,
and sexual identity. ' .7' If a couple, made up of a male and a male-to-
female transsexual, want to marry, and also want ensure that the law rec-
ognizes their marriage, what kind of direction will they get from this
rule? Is it enough that the transsexual has had a surgery? How extensive
need that surgery be? How can they be sure that their marriage will be
upheld by the law?
While certainty in a marriage law is indeed important, rules such as
the chromosome rule come with their own breed of uncertainty. Schlag
points out that rules also "necessarily entail uncertainty-but this uncer-
tainty is often difficult to see in concrete situations because we typically
defer or exteriorize the uncertainty.. 7. In other words, rules like the
chromosome test that cut out certain persons from the protection of the
law altogether create uncertainty outside of the law. Although this
271. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d i086, 1iio (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
272. Schlag, supra note 202, at 412.
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bright-line test is "certain" in that it is clear who does and does not fall
inside the definition of a certain sex, its application to real life is quite
uncertain. Those who do not conform to the generalized definition of
sex, i.e. those without naturally congruent sex characteristics, are left
without legal directives to guide their conduct. One law allows, and in-
deed encourages, them to change their sex, while another, the chromo-
some rule, negates the conduct natural to that sex. Any "certainty" thus
created through such a rule is, according to Schlag, arrived at simply by
"banishing [these] troublesome concerns." '273 The rule is only "certain" if
we are able and willing to ignore those for whom the law makes life un-
certain.
Certainty is also not exclusively a product of rules. A number of
scholars have recognized that standards can create certainty through
other mechanisms, such as precedent."4 Here, for example, if a number
of cases have, over time, found that a full sex change operation is suffi-
cient evidence that the transsexual is a person of her mental sex, a certain
amount of predictability and certainty is produced. While the judge
would still have the discretion required for borderline cases, people
would be able to better protect their expectations though positive con-
duct.
According to science and social policy, some flexibility is needed in
defining sex, which a multi-factored standard test would provide. As the
multi-factored standard courts demonstrated, science has determined
that sex cannot be defined in a limited fashion. Also, social policy has in
many ways demonstrated a commitment to recognizing the conflicting
sex characteristics of the transsexual. Despite this general acceptance of
change, neither science nor society has yet to narrow in on a particular
definition of sex. This uncertainty calls for a flexible standard, allowing
judges to be able to meet each case as it comes before her, in order to de-
termine the sex of the parties.
A rule also has the effect of imposing conformity on all persons
wishing to marry, i.e. that they all must marry the person of their oppo-
site chromosomal makeup. Many of the chromosome rule courts have
indeed held that a basis for their rule is a desire to promote the "tradi-
tional" role of marriage, which, presumably, is the union of opposite
physical sex persons in order to have children. This theory of marriage is
in direct contradiction with the current view of marriage, however. What
constitutes a marriage, and a family for that matter, is in a state of flux.
As one legal scholar stated, "[d]iversity, rather than a single model,
273. Id.at 41I.
274. See id. at 414.
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marks the chosen familial habitats for couples." '275 The court in M. T. em-
phasized that it is intimacy, not the raising of children, that is the building
block of a modern marriage. The diverse state of marriages calls for a
dynamic definition of marriage, especially where transsexuals are con-
cerned. If it is indeed intimacy which defines marriage, this is not possi-
ble when psychologically, a person is only capable of being intimate with
someone of a similar physical sex.
We are left with the standards' "vices" of manipulability and adven-
turism. There is some concern that judges in defining a party's sex will
manipulate the law to serve his or her own whim. These are not great
concerns in this context. It is first helpful to point out that manipulability
is only a concern when the judge's decision would run counter to the pol-
icy of the law. For example, Schauer cites as an example of possible deci-
sion-maker bias the case of Palmore v. Sidoti.276 In Palmore, the United
States Supreme Court determined that the best-interest standard gave
too much discretion to judges in determining whether a custody ar-
rangement was in the best interest of the child.277 The Court fashioned a
strict rule stating that a court could not take race into account in making
the custody decision. 78 The reason for this rule was that a court's "bias,
or the less invidious difference in perspective" would actually misguide a
judge into deciding upon a custody arrangement that was actually not in
the child's best interest.279
Here, however, there is no concern that a court, when it decides the
sex of the parties before it, will be acting contrary to the policies of the
laws it is interpreting. At most, these marriage laws have cited a concern
that marriage remains in its "traditional" form. Although the traditional
form includes only one "man" and one "woman," the statutes do not de-
fine what "traditional" means. Certainly, no court, including those set-
tling on the chromosome rule, has found that any legislature has set a
policy against allowing a person to marry the sex opposite to his or her
mental sex. In fact, each court faced with the task of defining a transsex-
ual's sex was doing so in the context of an established policy in its juris-
diction denying homosexuals the right to marry. Enabling a court to
recognize the gender identity of a transsexual for the purpose of mar-
riage would arguably further this policy."' For example, if a male-to-
275. Christensen, supra note 264, at 1316.
276. SCHAUER, supra note 220, at 150-51 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 42 U.S. 429 (1984)).
277. Id. at 15.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. While this Author certainly has an opinion about anti-homosexual marriage laws, that debate
is beyond the scope of this Note.
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female transsexual undergoes reassignment surgery, to the community
and to her partner she is a female. If she is then only allowed to marry
persons of the sex opposite her chromosomes, she will therefore be al-
lowed to marry females. Indeed, as one article pointed out, the effect of
this bright-line rule would be contrary to what society might deem ac-
81
ceptable. Utilizing a standard to determine the true sex of a transsexual
is the only device by which the anti-homosexual union policy in these ju-
risdictions can be furthered.
Another concern of some of the chromosome test courts was fraud.
These courts were concerned that transsexuals would be able to "fake"
an incongruent mental sex, thereby enabling them to obtain a marriage
that is, in essence, a forbidden homosexual union. Interestingly, accord-
ing to the usual "vices and virtues" debate, manipulation by the parties is
a vice of a rule, not of a standard. The argument is that setting a rule,
such as "do not drive over 6o miles per hour," will encourage people to
maximize undesired conduct. If the party is able to see that they can
drive 59 miles per hour without repercussions, they will. On the other
hand, a standard such as "drive as is safe," will encourage people to
maximize desired conduct, in order to ensure that they lie safely within
the law. Here, as well, there is an argument that it is the chromosome
rule that will encourage fraud. If a male-to-female post-operative trans-
sexual wants to marry a female, this is arguably bordering on conduct
contrary to the anti-homosexual marriage policy, as mentioned above.
However, the rule, which draws a clear line only at persons of the same
chromosomal makeup marrying, enables such conduct. A standard, on
the other hand, would better further the policy against homosexual mar-
riage by ensuring that in each case, the marriage parties are in fact one
"man" and one "woman."
Using Schauer's "lesser of two evils" approach leads to the conclu-
sion that a standard would be the optimal form with which to define sex.
Again, Schauer's theory is that the choice between forms is in fact a
weighing process, determined by which error, under- and over-inclusion
or decision-maker bias and mistakes, is more likely and more serious.
When defining a transsexual's sex for the purpose of marriage, the rule's
inherent errors are more serious and likely. First, the under-inclusion re-
sulting from a chromosome test is clear and proven. As mentioned
above, there are thousands of transsexuals known to be living in the
states. In addition, one out of every iooo persons are thought to have
281. David Link, Same-sex Marriage, with a Twist, SALON.COM, at http://archive.salon.com/mwt/
feature/2002/03/22/kansas ruling/index.html (Mar. 22, 2002) (noting that, after the Gardiner decision,
"Kansas, a state which has no ambiguity in its law prohibiting same-sex marriages, is now one of the
few places on Earth that requires transsexuals to be homosexual as a condition of marriage").
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some intersexual trait. These numbers clearly establish that the chromo-
some rule does not reach a correct result in every case. 8 ' The effects are
devastating. Transsexuals are left in a no-man's land. In order to enter
into a legally recognized relationship, the transsexual is forced to remain
in her incongruent sex state, a tragedy which many of us cannot fathom.
On the other hand, she must give up the hope of being in her natural re-
lationship in order to harmonize her conflicting sex traits through reas-
signment surgery. The standards-based decisions have in fact recognized
that there is a public policy against this result. According to the court in
M. T., "society has no right to prohibit the transsexual from leading a
normal life. '2"3 It is the court's duty, in the absence of contrary public
policy, to "promote the individual's quest for inner peace and personal
happiness." 4
On the other side, the errors inherent in choosing a standard are nei-
ther likely nor serious in the case of defining sex. As was pointed out in
the context of the virtues and vices analysis, there is no concern here that
a judge will make a decision that is "wrong" in terms of public policy. A
judge deciding the sex of the parties before it is not likely to be "mis-
guided" by any bias towards one sex or the other. Although the facts will
be unique in each case, they are relatively straightforward, promoting an
uncomplicated analysis.
The chromosome test courts however were not concerned with judi-
cial bias errors, but errors as a result of fraud by the parties. But fraud is
not a serious concern because a court using the standard test will look ex-
tensively into the mental, physical and environmental aspects of the
transsexual's case. The court will not recognize a person's mental sex
simply based on the party's own testimony. The cases that have come be-
fore the courts have all involved transsexuals who are either post-
operative, or who have provided the court with expert medical evidence
proving that their metal sex is incongruent with their physical sex. In fact,
the chromosome test courts never dispute this fact, but only reflect a
concern about the possibility that fraud may be involved.285 Additionally,
as will be discussed below, rule-like safeguards, such as requiring a doc-
tor's opinion of mental sex, will also ensure against fraud in these cases.
The next step is to determine whether the epistemological approach
to form determination sheds some light on the proper test to be used to
determine sex. At first glance, because this issue is complicated, where
282. This assumes, based on the social and scientific arguments above, that the "correct" sex is that
of the mental sex.
283. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.zd 204, 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (quoting from the trial court).
284. Id. at 211.
285. See In re Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 323 (1966).
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the definition of sex is ever-changing and partially unknown, it is tempt-
ing to conclude that standards are the better alternative. The future of
the definition of sex is indeed "uncertain and unpredictable," and the
types of situations that may come before the court are indeed varied and
uncountable. The problem is that whether a standard should be used de-
pends on whether lawmakers want to empower judges to include such
unknown situations in the definition of "male" or "female." As Schlag
points out, only uncertain questions of fact should be left to a judge, not
questions of policy. Therefore, a judge should only use a standard in de-
ciding unknown fact situations when he or she is guided by some set pol-
icy.
However, whether Schlag's distinction applies here is doubtful. The
chromosome rule courts have argued either that there is a clear policy,
which is for "traditional" marriages that do not encompass a union with a
transsexual, or that the policy is unclear, and it is the legislature's job to
make such a decision. Under either of these views, enabling a court to
decide on its own whether a transsexual should be able to marry a person
of her now opposite sex through a standard would be inappropriate. On
the other hand, the multi-factor standard courts have shown that there
are established policies that enable transsexual unions. These policies are
tools by which courts can interpret the directives of the legislature and
glean their underlying values. The multi-factor standard courts took into
account the changing understanding of transsexuals in science and in so-
ciety. These courts interpreted the marriage statutes in a way that re-
flected modem understandings of marriage as not simply baby-making
tools. Also, the courts recognized that legal policy, logically written by
the same legislatures, enables transsexuals in other areas of the law, in-
cluding through sex-change legalization and birth certificate changes.
While it is unlikely that any legislature has decided whether transsexual
unions should be allowed, it is also true that these policies ensure that
courts are not making value choices. Instead, they are deciding complex
legal problems in a way that is required by established legal policies.
Lastly, the various theories of the "form is never purely form" schol-
ars must be considered. It should be acknowledged that judicial decision-
making is based in large part on a judge's various personal, political and
psychological ideals. To deny this fact would be foolish. One can see this
by simply looking at the process for choosing a judge. If each judge was
sure to base his or her decisions purely on legal foundations, there would
be no reason why certain judicial candidates would be favored by one po-
litical group over another. Judges are human, whose ideas about how the
law should work will inevitably be based on more personal considera-
tions. This is not to say that judges inevitably have personal motives be-
1369
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
hind their choices. It is clear however, that one's personal philosophies
will inevitably provide some basis for one's legal philosophies.
That being said, it would be helpful to next look at some of the phi-
losophies that may affect one's choice of form to decide whether any ef-
fect may be inappropriate in this context. First, to look at Kennedy's
vision of the choice of form being dictated by one's feelings towards al-
truism, or alternatively, individualism. While this Note cannot put words
in Kennedy's mouth, it can attempt to describe how each of these views
might be reflected in a definition of sex law. An altruist simply wishes to
ensure that he can order his conduct to maximize his own happiness. This
requires set rules enabling people both to formulate expectations and
expect to have them protected. The chromosome rule is certainly such a
clear rule. The problem is that a transsexual is unable to order his con-
duct according to this rule. Unlike the contracts examples used above,
the transsexual cannot go out and change his or her chromosomes to re-
flect her mental sex. The altruist supports self-reliance, but only while
this egoism is "contained by a respect for the rights of others. '2'8 Without
this constraint, the justification for the philosophy, the ability for all to
choose to comply with the law, breaks down. Here, the rule does not re-
spect the "rights" of the transsexual, who is not in a position to comply.
Consequently, it does not seem that the individualist philosophy could
support the chromosome rule. An altruist, on the other hand, might
stress the interests of the transsexual and would want to ensure that the
law sympathized with the situation in which they find themselves. This
would surely call for some sort of legal flexibility so that each person will
be given the chance to have the benefits of marriage. A standard in some
form would be appropriate.
As discussed above, feminists have described males as associated
with nonaccommodation, precision, and skeptical pragmatism and fe-
males as associated with accommodation and fairness. Does this neces-
sarily mean that males would be inclined to turn a blind eye to the needs
of transsexuals? One can argue that the masculine and feminine traits
can be reconciled in the use of a standards-based test. Even if males are
pragmatic, in that they find it foolish to hope for "perfection" in an im-
perfect world, the analysis above shows that more precise results can be
reached using a standard rather then a chromosome rule. This is not a
"hope" or a romantic notion, but instead a practical answer to the prob-
lems created by scientific and social change. Science and social accom-
modation have shown that what is "male" and "female" is different than
what we originally thought. A standard can, working within the frame-
286. KELMAN, supra note 2oo, at 16.
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work of the already established marital policies, encompass this change.
Females might be drawn to this as this is an accommodation of the very
real circumstances of the transsexuals. Males also could feel comfortable
in the fact that more precise results are indeed being reached.
Lastly, Schauer's belief that rules are used in a conservative attempt
to block change seems to ring true in the rule-based courts' decisions. In-
deed, when one reads some of the cases that adopted rules, historical en-
trenchment is quite clear. Corbett held that the essential role of a woman
in a marriage is to birth children, while Littleton based its decision on the
"fact" that sex is "immutably fixed by our creator at birth." These courts
used rules to justify outdated and perhaps unpopular statements. If, on
the other hand, a standard was used, these courts would be forced to ac-
cept the reality that our society is not static, but ever changing. The
multi-factored standards courts recognized this even as early as the Mat-
ter of Anonymous decision in 1968. Clearly, when there is no legislative
policy directing the courts to adhere to the past, and when there is con-
trary legal, social and scientific evidence to show that change is indeed
required, the justification for a rule is minimal.
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR A HYBRID APPROACH
The above analysis of rules and standards suggests that there are
both benefits and downfalls to choosing a rule or a standard in all con-
texts. This Note then narrowed in on which of these problems and bene-
fits were applicable and important to the issue of finding a legal
definition of sex. In particular, this Author finds the "standard vice" of
uncertainty and lack of predictability troubling in this context. Without
more direction, transsexuals would find it hard to make choices with set
legal consequences. A pure standard, without guidelines for the decision-
makers, would send a message to transsexuals that they can possibly
marry a person of a sex opposite their mental sex, but would not describe
at all how this is to be done. On the other hand, the chromosome rule
comes with its own uncertainty, as it cuts out individuals from the protec-
tion of the law altogether, also leaving them with no direction.
The analysis also shows that in the context of our changing under-
standing of sex in science, society and the law, the "standard virtue" of
flexibility is important. Under Schauer's "lesser of two evils" analysis, the
chromosome rule carries with it more likely and more serious conse-
quences then a standard. Decision-maker bias was not a concern when
defining sex, while under-inclusion would indeed have negative and seri-
ous consequences. While not likely, decision-maker mistake, due possi-
bly to fraud by the parties, was a concern that should be addressed.
Finally, various personal and political philosophies could affect the
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choice of form, but it is clear that a standard would best meet the con-
cerns of each one.
With all of this information as a guide, what form then is most ap-
propriate? Is a rule, defining sex by the chromosomes, or a multi-
factored standard the correct approach? This Author would suggest that
the right test is in fact a hybrid of the two. The above analysis shows that
a standard must be used, such as the one developed by the Court of Ap-
peals in Gardiner, which stated that courts should determine sex looking
at a number of factors, including, but not limited to, "chromosome
makeup .... gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, external morphologic
sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex and gender of rearing,
and sexual identity. '2"7 This would ensure that the courts are able to be
flexible in defining sex according to established legal, social and scientific
advancements. Also, a standard would create a certain level of certainty
here, in that it would not cut out deserving people from the protection
and benefits of the law.
However, in order to meet the standard concerns discussed above, a
little certainty should be placed in the law. This Author suggests that a
rebuttable presumption be utilized. A possible presumption would be
that if a transsexual has undergone fifty percent or more of the appropri-
ate sex change procedure after a competent and licensed physician has
determined that the transsexual's mental sex is opposite that of his or her
physical sex, then a court should presume that the transsexual's legal sex
is that of his of her mental sex.' This presumption can be rebutted by
evidence sufficient to show that the person's mental and physical sex
were in fact congruent prior to surgery.
A presumption serves a number of functions. First, it serves an evi-
dentiary function. As the court in In re Kevin noted, according to the law,
"post-operative transsexuals will normally be members of their reas-
signed sex. ''28 This may be because the factors a doctor will weigh in de-
termining the sex of her patient are generally the same factors that are
involved in a court's decision. Because the court's determination of sex
will likely be based in large part on this medical science, the presumption
will serve to assume in evidence what in fact will occur after a thorough
evidentially presentation.
287. In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d lo86, 11o (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
288. For another possible presumption, see the test being developed by the English Parliament, as
discussed in ECONOMIST, supra note 82, at 54 (the transsexuals must prove that they "lived in their new
gender for at least two years and that they intend to live that way until death" to be determined a
member of the new gender).
289. In re Kevin, (2001) 28 Fam. L. R. 158 (Austl.), available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/
judge/2ooi/pdf/reKevin.pdf, at 86.
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Also, the rebuttable presumption minimizes the chance of fraud that
the chromosome rule courts were concerned about. First, the doctor's
opinion ensures that a party cannot defraud a court by electing a sex
change procedure solely for the purpose of entering a homosexual union.
Presumably a court can trust the claims of a party that are supported by
competent medical opinion. Also, the fact that the party is required to
have committed to her mental sex through undergoing a sex change pro-
cedure will ensure that the party's feelings are not fleeting. Because sex
reassignment procedures are often lengthy, complex and drawn out over
time, this Author suggests that only fifty percent of the procedure must
be completed to trigger the presumption. Many transsexuals do not
choose to undergo every procedure available to reassign their sex. Be-
cause of the invasive and personal nature of the procedures involved, it is
not for the courts, but for the person and her doctor to decide what is re-
quired in order to reach a congruent sex state. For the court's purpose of
avoiding fraud and mistake, however, an arbitrary fifty percent number
will ensure that the person has committed to this change. As the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights stated, "given the numerous and painful
interventions involved in such a surgery and the level of commitment and
conviction required to achieve a change in social gender role, [it cannot]
be suggested that there is anything arbitrary or capricious in the decision
taken by someone to undergo gender reassignment.""29 Lastly, the fact
that this presumption is rebuttable by evidence that the person's mental
and physical sex were not in fact incongruent before the reassignment
adds an added protection against mistake and fraud.
Most importantly, the presumption, which is in essence a rule, serves
a channeling function. Transsexuals will be able to give legal effect to
their expectations by following the procedure outlined in the presump-
tion. If a transsexual procures a doctor's note that her mental and physi-
cal sex are incongruent, and thereafter undergoes a sex reassignment
surgery, she can rest assured that a court will likely uphold a marriage
with a person of her now opposite sex. The presumption would infuse the
sex definition procedure with the measure of certainty and predictability
needed to allow transsexuals to order their lives. Therefore, the certainty
concerns of both the individualist philosophy and of the "virtues and
vices" analysis are satisfied.
The hybrid approach of course comes with its own problems, namely
that it is under-inclusive and that it removes some of the court's discre-
tion.29" ' The presumption is under-inclusive in that some persons are still
290. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2 FCR 577,67 BMLR i99, *14 (Eur. Ct. of H.R. 2002).
291. As mentioned earlier, an additional problem with the hybrid approach is that is does not en-
able homosexual marriage. Support for the standard is in fact based largely upon the fact that the
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left out of the protection of the law. Of particular concern are those who
may not be able to elect a sex reassignment procedure, either for eco-
nomic or other personal reasons. Consequently, these persons would not
be able to ensure that their life arrangements will be protected by the
law. It is important to note, however, that the reassignment procedure is
not required in order to establish a person's sex as her mental sex. A
court can consult other evidence showing that the person's sex is indeed
that of her mental sex in order to reach the same conclusion. The pre-
sumption merely acts as a mechanism to use to protect expectations, but
does not act to cut anyone out of the general protection of the law.
Although a presumption encompassing a greater number of persons
could be utilized, such as requiring only a doctor's note determining a
person's gender identity, this is not recommended. The reason for this is
that the policy behind the standard, which is to look at a number of fac-
tors to determine the sex of an individual, would not be met if that proc-
ess was trumped by simply deferring to one factor. The significance of
the flexibility requirement is that the current definition of sex includes
many factors, only one of these being a person's gender identity. Al-
though any presumption necessarily removes some of this discretion
away from the court, the presumption proposed by this Note will ensure
that the same factors the court would have considered are taken into ac-
count. As the chromosome rule courts established, courts today are too
worried about fraud, mistake and permanency to base their decisions
simply on one doctor's opinion. Requiring surgery would ensure the level
of commitment to the reassignment required to trump these concerns.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, although most states have marriage laws restricting
marriage to only a "man" and a "woman," the legislatures have not pro-
vided the courts with definitions of what these terms mean. This means
that post-operative transsexuals are in a state of flux, unsure of their le-
gal rights under the law. Because of the increasing number of people af-
fected by the ambiguities in these laws, the courts must step in and
interpret them.
The current scientific, political and social understanding of gender
identity disorder simply does not support the decisions of cases like
court must discern the "true" sex of the parties before it in order to further the established policy
against homosexual unions. Again, while this consequence is of genuine concern to this author, it is
beyond the Note's scope. The courts in the transsexual sex definition cases were faced with established
policies against homosexual unions, as is the case in most jurisdictions. A legally legitimate definition
of sex for the purpose of transsexual marriage in these jurisdiction must therefore take this policy into
account until these laws can be changed.
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Littleton and Gardiner. Science has accepted that chromosomes alone are
no longer the sole determinant of sex. The medical community recom-
mends sex reassignment surgery for transsexuals and certifies that post-
operative transsexuals are persons fully able to function in their reas-
signed sex. The law supports reassignment decisions by recognizing the
reassigned sex on birth certificates and in other areas of daily life.
While the courts must take into account the modern understanding
of sex when defining it, they also must consider the implications that
their decisions will have. This Note proposes that a rule/standard hybrid
test is the proper form through which a court can establish a sex defini-
tion. This approach seeks to combine the flexibility of a standard with
the certainty of a rule to arrive at a solution that maximizes the number
of correct legal decisions. Using this hybrid approach, transsexuals will
no longer be forced into a legal "limbo." The law, the community, and,
most importantly, the partners themselves will clearly understand what
sex is for the purpose of marriage. This approach will also end the griev-
ous predicaments of people like J'Noel, whose only hope of marrying is
to a person incompatible with who they really are. J'Noel should be able
to treat her disorder and live a healthy, happy, and fulfilling life. This
proposal allows just that.
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